University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers

Working Papers

2003

Beyond the Precautionary Principle
Cass R. Sunstein

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/public_law_and_legal_theory
Part of the Law Commons

Chicago Unbound includes both works in progress and final versions of articles. Please be
aware that a more recent version of this article may be available on Chicago Unbound, SSRN or
elsewhere.
Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein, "Beyond the Precautionary Principle" (University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper No. 38, 2003).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Working Papers at Chicago Unbound. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers by an authorized administrator of
Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 38

BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
Cass R. Sunstein

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

January 2003

This paper can be downloaded without charge at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html
and at The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=307098

Preliminary draft 1/12/03
All rights reserved

Beyond the Precautionary Principle
Cass R. Sunstein*
Abstract
The precautionary principle has been highly influential in legal systems all over the
world. In its strongest and most distinctive forms, the principle imposes a burden of proof
on those who create potential risks, and it requires regulation of activities even if it
cannot be shown that those activities are likely to produce significant harms. Taken in
this strong form, the precautionary principle should be rejected, not because it leads in
bad directions, but because it leads in no directions at all. The principle is literally
paralyzing— forbidding inaction, stringent regulation, and everything in between. The
reason is that in the relevant cases, every step, including inaction, creates a risk to
health, the environment, or both. This point raises a further puzzle. Why is the
precautionary principle widely seen to offer real guidance? The answer lies in
identifiable cognitive mechanisms emphasized by behavioral economists. In many cases,
loss aversion plays a large role, accompanied by a false belief that nature is benign.
Sometimes the availability heuristic is at work. Probability neglect plays a role as well.
Most often, those who use the precautionary principle fall victim to what might be called
“system neglect,” which involves a failure to attend to the systemic effects of regulation.
Examples are given from numerous areas, involving arsenic regulation, global warming
and the Kyoto Protocol, nuclear power, pharmaceutical regulation, cloning, pesticide
regulation, and genetic modification of food. The salutary moral and political goals of
the precautionary principle should be promoted through other, more effective methods.

*

Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of
Political Science, University of Chicago. I am grateful to valuable comments from Peter Dorman, Jack
Knetsch, Saul Levmore, Eric Posner, Indra Spiecker, and Adrian Vermeule, and from participants in the
Midwest Faculty Seminar. I am also grateful to Martha Nussbaum for helpful discussions.

I. Introduction
All over the world, there is increasing interest in a simple idea for the regulation
of risk: In case of doubt, follow the precautionary principle.1 Avoid steps that will create
a risk of harm. Until safety is established, be cautious; do not require unambiguous
evidence. In a catchphrase: Better safe than sorry. In ordinary life, pleas of this kind seem
quite sensible, indeed a part of ordinary human rationality. People buy smoke alarms and
insurance. They wear seatbelts and motorcycle helmets, even if they are unlikely to be
involved in an accident. Shouldn’t the same approach be followed by rational regulators
as well? Many people believe so.2
A. Problems With Precautions
I aim to challenge the precautionary principle here, not because it leads in bad
directions, but because read for all that it is worth, it leads in no direction at all. The
principle threatens to be paralyzing, forbidding regulation, inaction, and every step in
between.3 To explain this problem very briefly, the precautionary principle provides help
only if we blind ourselves to many aspects of risk-related situations and focus on a
narrow subset of what is at stake.4 A significant part of my discussion will be devoted to
showing why this is so. I will also urge that the precautionary principle gives the (false)
appearance of being workable only because of identifiable cognitive mechanisms, which
lead people to have a narrow rather than wide viewscreen. With that narrow viewscreen,
it is possible to ignore, or to neglect, some of the risks that are actually at stake. I
emphasize that we have good reason to endorse the goals that motivate many people to
endorse the precautionary principle. These goals include the importance of protecting
1

See, for general discussion, Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Tim O'Riordan and James Cameron
eds. 2002); Protecting Public Health & the Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle
(Carolyn Raffensberger & Joel Tickner eds. 1999).
2
See the account of widespread international support below.
3
For criticisms that also emphasize the range of risks at stake, but without stressing the paralyzing quality
of the principle, see Wiener, supra note; Indur Goklany, The Precautionary Principle (2001).
4
For discussion of the possibly perverse effects of the precautionary principle, see Frank B. Cross,
Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 851 (1996). I think that much of
what Cross says is convincing, but my emphasis here is quite different: I stress the cognitive foundations of
the principle and urge not that the principle leads in perverse directions but that it offers no guidance at all.

2

health and the environment even from remote risks; the need to attend to unintended
adverse effects of technological change; and the need to ensure that wealthy countries
pay their fair share for environmental improvement and risk reduction. But the
precautionary principle is a crude way of protecting these goals, which should be pursued
directly. I do not attempt to develop any particular replacement for the precautionary
principle, but I do argue on behalf of wide viewscreens in the regulation of risks.
In making these claims, I will be challenging an idea that has been a staple of
regulatory policy for several decades.5 Indeed, it has been claimed that the precautionary
principle has become, or at least is becoming, a binding part of customary international
law.6 In the mid-1970s, German environmental policy was founded on the basis of
Vorsorgeprinzip, a precursor of the precautionary principle.7 With respect to risks,
German policy has been described as seeing “precaution” as a highly interventionist idea,
one that embodies “a loose and open-ended interpretation of precaution.”8 In the United
States, federal courts, without using the term explicitly, have built in a notion of
precaution in some important cases, allowing or requiring regulation on the basis of
conservative assumptions.9 The precautionary principle has played a significant role in
international documents, to the point where it has become ubiquitous. Variations on the
notion can be found in at least fourteen international documents.10 In 1982, the United

5

For helpful discussion, see David Freestone and Ellen Hey, Origins and Development of the
Precautionary Principle, in The Precautionary Principle and International Law 3 (David Freestone and
Ellen Hey eds. 1994); Jonathan Wiener, Precaution in a Multirisk World, in The Risk Assessment of
Environmental and Human Health Hazards (Dennis D. Paustenbach, ed., 2d ed., 2002, forthcoming).
6
See O. McIntyre and T. Mosedale, The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary International
Law, 9 J Env Law 221 (1997); see generally Arie Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary
Principle in International Law (2002).
7
Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in Risk and the Precautionary Principle 1, 1 (Julian
Morris ed. 2001).
8
See Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (T. O’Riordan and J. Cameron eds. 1994).
9
See, e.g., American Trucking Association v. EPA, F.3d (DC Cir 2002); Lead Industries v. EPA, 647 F.2d
1130 (DC Cir 1980).
10
See Indur Goklany, The Precautionary Principle 3 (2001). Indeed there appears to be a cascade effect
here, with informational and reputational influences leading to many casual uses of the precautionary
principle, to the point where a failure to incorporate the principle would seem to be a radical statement.
Simply because the precautionary principle has been used so often, those involved in international
agreements are likely to believe that it is probably sensible to use it yet again. And because so many people
identify the precautionary principle with a serious commitment to environmental protection, see, e.g.,
Protecting Public Health & the Environment, supra note, any nation that rejects the principle risks incurring
international opprobrium. For a general treatment of informational cascades, in which decisions by others
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Nations World Charter for Nature apparently gave the first international recognition to
the principle, suggesting that when “potential adverse effects are not fully understood, the
activities should not proceed.”11 The closing Ministerial Declaration from the United
Nations Economic Conference for Europe in 1990 asserts, “In order to achieve
sustainable development, policies must be based on the precautionary principle. . . .
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental
degradation.”12
The

widely

publicized

Wingspread

Declaration,

from

a

meeting

of

environmentalists in 1998, goes further still: “When an activity raises threats of harm to
human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some
cause and effect relationships are not established scientifically. In this context the
proponent of the activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof.”13 The
European Union treaty states that on the environment, EU policy “shall be based on the
precautionary principle.”14 Notwithstanding official American ambivalence about the
principle,15 there are unmistakable echoes of the principle in American environmental
law.16 The precautionary principle has received a high-profile endorsement in the New
York Times Magazine, which listed the principle as one of the most important ideas of
2001.17 In February 2002, the precautionary principle was explicitly adopted by the
European Commission, together with implementing guidelines.18

convey information about what it makes sense to do, see David Hirschleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind:
Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades, in The New Economics of Human Behavior 188, 189
(Mariano Tommasi and Kathryn Ierulli eds 1995). On reputational pressures, see Timur Kuran, Public Lies,
Private Truths (1996).
11
Goklany, supra note, at 4.
12
Id. at 5.
13
Id.
14
European Union Treaty, article 130R (1993), currently Article 174.
15
See John Graham, The Role of Precaution and Risk Assessment in Risk Managament: An American’s
View (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eu_speech.html; Wiener, supra note.
16
Seethe reference to an “adequate margin of safety” in the Clean Air Act, section 109, 42 USC 7409(b(1).
17
The Year in Ideas: A to Z, New York Times, December 9, 2001, p. 92, column 2.
18
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/press/press38_en.html
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In many ways the precautionary principle seems quite sensible, even appealing.
To justify regulation, a certainty of harm should not be required; a risk, even a low one,
may well be enough. It makes sense to expend resources to prevent a small chance of
disaster; consider the high costs, pecuniary and otherwise, that are spent to reduce the risk
of terrorist attack. On reasonable assumptions, these costs are worth incurring even if the
probability of harm, in individual cases or even in the aggregate, is relatively low. The
precautionary principle might well be seen as a plea for a kind of regulatory insurance.
Certainly the principle might do some real-world good, spurring them to attend to
neglected problems. Nonetheless, I will be urging that the principle cannot be fully
defended in these ways, simply because risks are on all sides of social situations. Any
effort to be universally precautionary will be paralyzing, forbidding every imaginable
step, including no step at all.
B. Precautions and Rationality
But if the precautionary principle, taken in a strong form, is unhelpful, in a way
literally senseless, how can we account for its extraordinary influence, and indeed for the
widespread belief that it can and should guide regulatory judgments? I have mentioned its
possible pragmatic value. And undoubtedly the principle is invoked strategically by selfinterested political actors, with European farmers, for example, invoking the idea of
precaution to stifle American competitors, who are far more likely to rely on genetically
modified crops.19 But apart from this point, I suggest that an understanding of human
rationality and cognition provides five useful clues.
1. Loss aversion. The precautionary principle often seems appealing because of loss
aversion. The central point here is that people dislike losses far more than they
like corresponding gains.20 The result is that out-of-pocket costs, or deterioration
from the status quo, seem much worse than opportunity costs, or benefits lost as a
result of continuing the status quo. In the context of risks, people tend to focus on
19

See Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan L Rev 683
(1999).
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the losses that are associated with some activity or hazard, and to disregard the
gains that might be associated with that activity or hazard. The precautionary
principle often becomes operational only because of loss aversion, as people take
precautions against potential losses from the status quo, but neglect potential
benefits that would be unmistakable gains. A closely related point is that
unfamiliar risks produce far more concern than familiar ones, even if the latter are
statistically larger; and the precautionary principle, in practice, is much affected
by this fact.
2. The myth of a benevolent nature. Loss aversion is often accompanied by a
mistaken belief that nature is essentially benign,21 leading people to think that
safety and health are generally at risk only or mostly as a result of human
intervention. A belief in the relative safety of nature and the relative risk of new
technologies often informs the precautionary principle.
3. The availability heuristic. It is well known that people focus on some risks simply
because they are cognitively “available,” whereas other risks are not.22 When the
precautionary principle seems to require stringent controls on one risk, even
though other risks are in the vicinity, the availability heuristic is a common
reason. And when the availability heuristic is at work, certain hazards will stand
out whether or not they are not statistically large. 23 The hazards associated with
heat waves, for example, receive little public attention, while the hazards
associated with air travel are a significant source of public concern24; one reason
is that the latter hazards come readily to mind.
4. Probability neglect. People are sometimes prone to neglect the probability that a
bad outcome will occur; they focus instead on the outcome itself.25 The
precautionary principle often embodies a form of probability neglect. At least this

20

See Richard Thaler, Quasi-Rational Economics (1995).
See generally James P. Collman, Naturally Dangerous (2001).
22
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 11-14
(1982).
23
Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk 40 (2000).
24
See Eric Klinenberg, Heat Wave: A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago (2002).
25
Yuval Rottenstreich and Christopher Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the Affective
Psychology of Risk, 12 Psych Science 185, 188 (2001).
21
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is so when people invoke the precautionary principle to favor stringent controls on
a low-probability risk, when the consequence of those very controls is to give rise
to new risks of equal or greater probability.26
5. System neglect. The precautionary principle often reflects a general neglect of the
systemic effects of regulation.27 When a single problem is placed in view, it can
be difficult to see the full consequences of legal interventions. Sometimes the
precautionary principle has the appearance of being workable only because a
subset of the relevant effects are “on screen”—and hence there seems to be no
need to take precautions against other possible adverse effects, also involving
health and safety, that do not register. An important aspect of system neglect is
tradeoff neglect, one source of the conflict between experts and ordinary people in
thinking about risks.28 When experts disagree with ordinary people about risks, it
is sometimes because experts look at both the benefits and the harms associated
with the relevant practice, whereas ordinary people are paying attention to the
harms but not the benefits.29 I suggest that the precautionary principle seems
appealing, to ordinary people, in large part for the same reason.
One of my major goals is show that the precautionary principle can be made
workable only through routes of this kind. An understanding of behavioral economics
simultaneously sheds light on the operation of the principle, explains its otherwise
puzzling appeal, and suggests why it should be abandoned or at least substantially recast.
Indeed, such an understanding provides a better understanding of the uses and pitfalls of
the old adage, “better safe than sorry,” which is subject to many of the same objections as
the precautionary principle. I do not attempt to identify a competing principle for
adoption by sensible regulators. But I do urge that such regulators should use a wide
rather than narrow viewscreen—and that as applied, the precautionary principle is
defective precisely because it runs afoul of this idea. To be sure, many of those who
26

In some cases, this is a reasonable reading of the evidence governing genetically modified food. See Alan
McHughen, Pandora’s Picnic Basket 230-42 (2000); note in particular the evidence of harms from organic
foods, discussed in id.
27
See Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure 6-42 (1996).
28
The conflict is treated in Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk (2000).
29
See Howard Margolis, Dealing With Risk (1996).
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endorse the principle seek to protect against neglect of the future, disregard of the
interests of those suffering from the greatest deprivation, and impossible demands for
unambiguous evidence from regulators. But as we shall see, the precautionary principle is
a crude and sometimes perverse way of promoting those goals, which can be obtained
through other, better routes. A major purpose of this Essay is to suggest the need to use
more direct effective strategies to pursue the salutary goals of risk regulation.
This Article comes in four parts. Part I briefly traces the nature and the appeal of
the precautionary principle. Part II explains why the principle is paralyzing, with
particular reference to the issues raised by arsenic, global warming, nuclear power, and
genetic engineering of food. Part III suggests that the apparent sense of the principle is
best understood in light of the behavioral points just mentioned. Part IV is a brief
conclusion, in the form of a plea for wider viewscreens.
II. The Precautionary Principle: Definition and Appeal
I have said that the precautionary principle enjoys widespread international
support.30 But what does the principle mean or require? There are numerous definitions,
and they are not compatible with one another.31 We can imagine a continuum of
understandings. At one extreme are weak versions to which no reasonable person could
object; at the other extreme are strong versions that would appear to call for a
fundamental rethinking of regulatory policy.
The most cautious and weak versions suggest, quite sensibly, that a lack of
decisive evidence of harm should not be a ground for refusing to regulate. Regulation
might be justified even if we cannot establish a definite connection between, for example,
low-level exposures to certain carcinogens and adverse effects on human health. Thus the
1992 Rio Declaration states, “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
30

See Arie Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law (2002).
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measures to prevent environmental degradation.”32 The Ministerial Declaration of the
Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, held in London in
1987, is in the same vein: “Accepting that in order to protect the North Sea from possibly
damaging effects of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary principle is
necessary which may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a
causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence.”33 Similarly, the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change offers cautious language:
“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
should not be used as a reason for postponing [regulatory] measures, taking into account
that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.”34
The Wingspread Declaration goes somewhat further: “When an activity raises
threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be
taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.
In this context the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden
of proof.”35 The first sentence just quoted is a mildly more aggressive version of the
statement from the Rio Declaration. It is more aggressive because it is not limited to
threats of serious or irreversible damage. But in reversing the burden of proof, the second
sentence goes further still.36 Of course everything depends on what those with the burden
of proof must show in particular.
In Europe, the precautionary principle is understood in a still stronger way,
suggesting that it is important to build “a margin of safety into all decision making.”37
According to one definition, the precautionary principle means “that action should be
31

See Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in Risk and the Precautionary Principle, supra,
at 1-19; Wiener, supra note.
32
Quoted in Bjorn Lomborg The Skeptical Environmentalist 347 (2001).
33
Quoted in Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle 3, Julian Morris ed. (2000).
34
See Goklany, supra note, at 6.
35
See http://www.monitor.net/rachel/r586.html
36
See the discussion in Wiener, supra note; David Pearce, The Preconditions for Achieving Consensus in
the Context of Technological Risk, in Technological Risk: Its Perception and Handling in the European
Community (M. Dierkes et al. eds 1980).
37
See Bjorn Lomborg The Skeptical Environmentalist 348 (2001).
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taken to correct a problem as soon as there is evidence that harm may occur, not after the
harm has already occurred.”38 In a comparably strong version, it is said that “the
precautionary principle mandates that when there is a risk of significant health or
environmental damage to others or to future generations, and when there is scientific
uncertainty as to the nature of that damage or the likelihood of the risk, then decisions
should be made so as to prevent such activities from being conducted unless and until
scientific evidence shows that the damage will not occur.”39 The Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted in 2000, appears to adopt a
strong version as well.40 The Final Declaration of the First European “Seas At Risk”
conference says that if “the ‘worst case scenario’ for a certain activity is serious enough
then even a small amount of doubt as to the safety of that activity is sufficient to stop it
taking place.”41
Professor Richard Stewart usefully distinguishes among four different versions of
the precautionary principle, capturing both weak and strong types42; I paraphrase his
typology here:
1. Nonpreclusion Precautionary Principle: Regulation should not be precluded by the
absence of scientific uncertainty about activities that pose a risk of substantial harm.
2. Margin of Safety Precautionary Principle: Regulation should include a margin of
safety, limiting activities below the level at which adverse effects have not been
found or predicted.
3. Best Available Technology Precautionary Principle: Best available technology
requirements should be imposed on activities that pose an uncertain potential to create

38

http://www.logophilia.com/WordSpy/precautionaryprinciple.asp
Testimony of Dr. Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth, before the Senate Appropriate
Committee, Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services (Jan. 24, 2002).
40
See Goklany, supra note, at 6.
41
Final Declaration of the First European “Seas At Risk” Conference, Annex 1, Copenhagen, 1994.
42
Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulatory Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 20 Research in Law
and Economics 71, 76 (2002).
39
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substantial harm, unless those in favor of those activities can show that they present
no appreciable risk.
4. Prohibitory Precautionary Principle: Prohibitions should be imposed on activities
that have an uncertain potential to impose substantial harm, unless those in favor of
those activities can show that they present no appreciable risk.
This account shows that the precautionary principle might be described both in
terms of the level of uncertainty that triggers a regulatory response and in terms of the
tool that will be chosen in the face of uncertainty (as in the case of technological
requirements or prohibitions). With an appreciation of this point, we can easily imagine
many other variations on these themes. For example, an Information Disclosure
Precautionary Principle might say that in the face of uncertainty, those who subject
people to potential risks must disclose relevant information to those so subjected. The
debate over labeling genetically modified organism can be seen as a debate over this form
of the precautionary principle.43 For every regulatory tool, there is a corresponding
precautionary principle,44 with possible matches or mismatches between the problem that
causes for precautions and the chosen tool.45 The idea of “margin of safety” can be
understood in multiple different ways, with a continuum from a small margin, designed
to counteract likely risks, to a small one, designed to prevent worst cases.
The official account in Europe is very much in favor of one or another version of
the precautionary principle, with the European Commission having formally adopted it.46
But European practice is far more complex, with the precautionary principle being
invoked against some risks but not against others.47 To take just one example, “Europe

43

See Alan McHughen, Pandora’s Picnic Basket 201-29 (2000).
For discussions of regulatory tools, see Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform 36-183 (1982); Cass
R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason 251-88 (2002).
45
On mismatch, see Breyer, supra, at 191-96.
46
European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM
(200)!, Brussels, 2 Feb. 2000 (available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub7_en.pdf
47
See the illuminating discussion in Jonathan Wiener and Michael Rogers, Comparing Precaution in the
United States and Europe, 5 J Risk Research 317 (2002).
44
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has been more precautionary about hormones in beef, while the US has been more
precautionary about mad cow disease (BSE) in beef and blood donations.”48 While
European nations have taken a highly precautionary approach to genetically modified
foods,49 the United States has been especially willing to control the risks associated with
carcinogens in food additives.50 In the context of occupational risk, American law is far
more precautionary than Swedish law.51 I cannot venture a survey here, but it is
reasonable to speculate that in actual practice, nations cannot plausibly be ranked along
some continuum of precaution. More plausibly, some nations are precautionary about
some risks but not others, and a general adoption of the precautionary principle will
conceal this inevitable fact.52 I will return to this point and to its inevitability below,
because it is closely connected to my central claims here. Nonetheless, the mounting
importance of the principle in Europe deserves close attention, if only because the idea of
precaution is playing such a large role in public debates.
I have suggested that the weak versions of the precautionary principle are
unobjectionable and important. Every day, people take steps (and incur costs) to avoid
hazards that are far from certain. We do not walk in moderately dangerous areas at night;
we exercise; we buy smoke detectors; we buckle our seatbelts; we might even avoid fatty
foods. Sensible governments are willing to consider regulation of risks that, in individual
cases or even in the aggregate, have a well under 100% chance of coming to fruition. The
weak versions of the precautionary principle state a truism—uncontroversial and
necessary only to combat public confusion or the self-interested claims of private groups
demanding unambiguous evidence of harm, which no rational society requires. This
function should not be trivialized. Nearly a fifth of Americans, for example, recently
48

Id. at 323.
See David Vogel, The Regulation of GMOs in Europe and the United States: A Case-Study of
Contemporary European Regulatory Politics (Publication of the Study Group on Trade, Science and
Genetically Modified Foods, 2001), available at http://www.cfr.org/pubs/Victor_ModFood_Paper2.html;
Symposium, Are the US and Europe Heading for a Food Fight Over Genetically Modified Food? (2001),
available at http://pewagbiotech.org/events/1024/; TonyGilland, Precaution, GM Crops, and Farmland
Birds, in Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle 84, 84-88 (Julian Morris ed. 2001).
50
See Richard Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice
or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 Yale J. on Reg. 1 (1988).
51
See Steven Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational
Safety and Health Policy (1981).
49
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agreed that “until we are sure that global warming is really a problem, we should not take
any steps that would have economic costs.”53 Sometimes people do seem to seek
certainty before showing a willingness to expend costs, and well-organized private
groups like to exploit this fact. Insofar as the precautionary principle counteracts the
tendency to demand certainty, it should be approved.
Because the weak versions are sensible, I will not discuss them here. Instead I will
understand the principle in a strong way, to suggest that regulation is required whenever
there is a possible risk to health, safety, or the environment, even if the supporting
evidence is speculative and even if the economic costs of regulation are high. To avoid
palpable absurdity, the idea of “possible risk” will be understood to require a certain
threshold of scientific plausibility. To support regulation, no one thinks that it is enough
if someone, somewhere, urges that a risk is worth taking seriously. But under the
precautionary principle as I shall understand it, the threshold burden is minimal, and once
it is met, there is something like a presumption in favor of stringent regulatory controls. I
believe that this understanding of the precautionary principle fits with the understandings
of its most enthusiastic proponents,54 and that with relatively modest variations, this
understanding fits with many of the legal formulations as well.55
Why might the precautionary principle, understood in this strong sense, have such
widespread appeal? At first glance, the answer is simple, for the principle contains some
important truth. Sometimes it is much better to be safe than sorry. Certainly we should
acknowledge that a small probability (say, 1 in 100,000) of a serious harm (say, 100,000
deaths) deserves extremely serious attention. It is worthwhile to spend a lot of money to
eliminate that risk. The fact that a danger is unlikely to materialize is hardly a decisive
objection to regulatory controls. Now an economically oriented critic might observe that
our resources are limited and that if we spend large amounts of resources on highly
52

See Wiener and Rogers, supra note.
See http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/GlobalWarming/buenos_aires.html#1
54
See the essays in Protecting Public Health & the Environment : Implementing the Precautionary
Principle, Carolyn Raffensberger & Joel Tickner eds. (1999).
55
See Lothar Gundling, The Status in International Law of the Principle of Precautionary Action, 5 Intl J.
Estuarine and Coastal Law 23, 26 (1990).
53
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speculative harms, we will not be allocating those resources wisely. In fact this is the
simplest criticism of the precautionary principle.56 Unless the harm would be truly
catastrophic, a huge investment makes no sense for a harm that has a 1 in 1 billion chance
of occurring. Taken for all that it is worth, the precautionary principle might seem to
require indefensibly huge expenditures, exhausting our budget well before the menu of
options could be thoroughly consulted.57 If we take costly steps to address all risks,
however improbable they are, we will quickly impoverish ourselves. On this view, the
principle “would make for a dim future.”58 This is no less true for nations than for
individuals.
Some version of this argument is surely convincing, but it also seems to be
missing something about human cognition.59 In some contexts, regulation is indeed a
form of insurance, or a way of placing special locks on a door. Consider the following
choice. Would you rather have
1. A sure loss of $20, or
2. A 1% chance of losing $1980?
In terms of expected value, (b), representing a statistical loss of $19.80, is a bit
less bad than (a); but most people would gladly choose the sure loss of $20.60 People do
not like to run a small risk of a large or catastrophic loss; this is why people buy
insurance and take special precautions against serious harms, even in circumstances in
which an analysis of expected value would not justify these steps.61 If government
follows the judgments of ordinary people, it will be risk-averse in this sense as well. The
willingness to incur sure losses, in preference to low-probability catastrophes of lower
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expected value, helps explain decisions in a variety of domains, involving both law and
politics, including foreign policy.62
This point about judgment under risk might seem to suggest that a democratic
society, following popular views, will depart from the predictions of expected utility
theory and even embody a form of risk aversion for low-probability catastrophes.63 The
result will be to move regulation in the direction suggested by the precautionary
principle. But prospect theory cannot provide a defense of the principle in its strong form.
I now explain why this is so.
1.

Why the Precautionary Principle Is Paralyzing

A. The Problem
The most serious problem with the precautionary principle is that it offers no
guidance—not that it is wrong, but that it forbids all courses of action, including inaction.
To understand this point, it will be useful to anchor the discussion in some concrete
problems:
1. One of the most controversial environmental issues faced in the first year of the
Bush administration involved the regulation of arsenic.64 There is a serious
dispute over the precise level of risks posed by low levels of arsenic in drinking
water, but on the “worst case” scenario, over one hundred lives might be lost each
year as a result of the 50 part per billion standard that the Clinton Administration
sought to revise.65 At the same time, the proposed 10 ppb standard would cost
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over $200 million each year, and it is possible that it would save as few as six
lives annually.66
2. Genetic modification of food has become a widespread practice.67 But the risks of
that practice are not known with precision.68 Some people fear that genetic
modification will result in serious ecological harm and large risks to human
health.69
3. Scientists are not in accord about the dangers associated with global warming,70
but there is general agreement that global warming is in fact occurring.71 It is
possible that global warming will produce, by 2100, a mean temperature increase
of 4.5 degrees C72; that it will result in well over $5 trillion in annual monetized
costs73; and that it will also produce a significant number of deaths from malaria.
The Kyoto Protocol would require most industrialized nations to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions to 92%-94% of 1990 levels.74
4. Many people fear nuclear power, on the ground that nuclear power plants raise
various health and safety issues, including some possibility of catastrophe.75 But
if a nation does not rely on nuclear power, it is likely to rely instead on fossil
fuels, and in particular on coal-fired power plants.76 Such plants create risks of
their own, including risks associated with global warming. China, for example,
has relied on nuclear energy in part as a way of reducing greenhouse gases and in
part as a way of reducing other air pollution problems.77
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5. There is a possible conflict between the protection of marine mammals and
military exercises. The United States Navy, for example, engages in many such
exercises, and it is possible that marine mammals will be threatened as a result.
Military activities in the oceans might well cause significant harm; but a decision
to suspend those activities, in cases involving potential harm, might also endanger
military preparedness.78
In these cases, what kind of guidance is provided by the precautionary principle?
It is tempting to say, as is in fact standard, that the principle calls for strong controls on
arsenic, on genetic engineering of food, on greenhouse gases, on threats to marine
mammals, and on nuclear power.79 In all of these cases, there is a possibility of serious
harms, and no authoritative scientific evidence suggests that the possibility is close to
zero. If the burden of proof is on the proponent of the activity or processes in question,
the precautionary principle would seem to impose a burden of proof that cannot be met.
Put to one side the question whether the precautionary principle, understood to compel
stringent regulation in these cases, is sensible. Let us ask a more fundamental question: Is
that more stringent regulation therefore compelled by the precautionary principle?
The answer is that it is not. In some of these cases, it should be easy to see that in
its own way, stringent regulation would actually run afoul of the precautionary principle.
The simplest reason is that such regulation might well deprive society of significant
benefits, and for that reason produce a large number of deaths that would otherwise not
occur. In some cases, regulation eliminates the “opportunity benefits” of a process or
activity, and thus causes preventable deaths.80 If this is so, regulation is hardly
precautionary. The most familiar cases involve the “drug lag,” produced by a highly
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precautionary approach to the introduction of new medicines and drugs into the market.81
If a government takes such an approach, it might protect people against harms from
inadequately tested drugs; but it will also prevent people from receiving potential beneits
from those very drugs.82 Is it “precautionary” to require extensive premarketing testing,
or to do the opposite?
Or consider the case of genetic modification of food. Many people believe that a
failure to allow genetic modification might well result in numerous deaths, and a small
probability of many more.83 The reason is that genetic modification holds out the promise
of producing food that is both cheaper and healthier—resulting, for example, in “golden
rice,” which might have large benefits in developing countries.84 Now the point is not that
genetic modification will definitely have those benefits, or that the benefits of genetic
modification outweigh the risks. The point is only that if the precautionary principle is
taken literally, it is offended by regulation as well as by nonregulation. So too for
regulation of ground-level ozone. Such regulation does seem justified by the
precautionary principle, for responsible people believe that low levels of ozone produce a
range of health harms, including risks of death.85 But there is also evidence that groundlevel ozone produces health benefits, by reducing risks of cataracts and skin cancer. 86
Because the precautionary principle calls for protection when causal connections are
unclear, it would appear to require, with respect to ground-level ozone, both stringent
regulation and no regulation at all.
Sometimes regulation would violate the precautionary principle because it would
give rise to substitute risks, in the form of hazards that materialize, or are increased, as a
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result of regulation.87 Consider the case of nuclear power. It is reasonable to think that in
light of current options, a ban on nuclear power will increase dependence on fossil
fuels,88 which contribute to global warming. If so, such a ban would seem to run afoul of
the precautionary principle. Or consider the EPA’s effort to ban asbestos,89 a ban that
might well seem justified or even compelled by the precautionary principle. The
difficulty, from the standpoint of that very principle, is that substitutes for asbestos also
carry risks.90 Or return to possible risks to marine mammals from the United States Navy.
Some people are concerned that efforts to eliminate those risks will endanger military
preparedness, if only because of administrative barriers to training exercises.91 In these
circumstances, what is the appropriate approach, according to the precautionary
principle?
The problem is pervasive. In the case of arsenic, the Administrator of the EPA has
expressed concern that regulation, by virtue of its cost, will lead people to cease using
local water systems and to rely on private wells, which have high levels of
contamination.92 If this is so, stringent arsenic regulation violates the precautionary
principle, no less than less stringent regulation does. This is a common situation, for
opportunity benefits and substitute risks are the rule, not the exception.93
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It is possible to go much further. A great deal of evidence suggests the possibility
that an expensive regulation can have adverse effects on life and health. 94 To be sure,
both the phenomenon and the underlying mechanisms are disputed. 95 It has been urged
that a statistical life can be lost for every expenditure of $7 million96; it has also been
estimated that the requisite expenditure, for a loss of life, is $50 million97; and one of the
most careful studies suggests a cutoff point, for a loss of life per regulatory expenditure,
of $15 million.98 A striking study suggests that poor people are especially vulnerable to
this effect—that a regulation that reduces wealth for the poorest 20% of the population
will have twice as large a mortality effect as a regulation that reduces wealth for the
wealthiest 20%.99 I do not mean to accept any particular amount here, or even to suggest
that there has been an unambiguous demonstration of an association between mortality
and regulatory expenditures.100 The only point is that reasonable people believe in that
association. It follow that a multimillion dollar expenditure for “precaution” has—as a
worst case scenario—significant adverse health effects, with an expenditure of $200
million as leading to perhaps as many as thirty to forty lives lost.
This point makes the precautionary principle hard to implement not merely where
regulation removes “opportunity benefits,” or introduces or increases substitute risks, but
also in any case in which the regulation costs a significant amount. If this is so, the
precautionary principle, for that very reason, seems to argue against many regulations. If
the precautionary principle argues against any action that carries a small risk of
significant harm, then we should be reluctant to spend a lot of money to reduce risks,
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simply because those expenditures themselves carry risks. Here is the sense in which, the
precautionary principle, taken for all that it is worth, is paralyzing: It stands as an
obstacle to regulation and nonregulation, and to everything in between. To say this is not
to say that the precautionary principle cannot be amended in a way that removes the
problem.101 But once it is so amended, it is much less distinctive, and increasingly
resembles an effort to weight the health benefits or regulation against the health costs,102
or even to measure benefits against costs. I will return to this point below.
It is now easier to understand the earlier suggestion that despite its formal
enthusiasm for the precautionary principle, European nations are not “more
precautionary” than the United States. Jonathan Wiener and Michael Rogers have
demonstrated this point empirically.103 It would be most valuable to attempt to
comparative study, to see which nations are especially precautionary with respect to
which risks, and also to explore changes over time. In the early twenty-first century, for
example, the United States appears to take a highly precautionary approach to the risks
associated with abandoned hazardous waste dumps,104 terrorism, and the provision of
universal health care, but not to take a highly precautionary approach to the risks
associated with global warming,105 indoor air pollution, poverty, poor diet, and obesity.
What I have been urging is that the selectivity of precautions is not merely an empirical
fact; it is a conceptual inevitability. Simply as a logical matter, no society can be highly
precautionary with respect to all risks.
B. Rejoinders, Adjustments, and Salutary Goals
Is there anything that might be said, at this stage, by proponents of the
precautionary principle? There are several possibilities.
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1. The weak version. It might be tempting to revert to the weak version of the
principle—a version that is entirely unobjectionable. Alternatively, it might be urged that
in many cases in which the principle is invoked, the risk at issue is the one that deserves
the most sustained attention. In the context of global warming, for example, the
precautionary principle might be triggered on the ground that the potential risks of
warming are far greater than the risks associated with the reduction of greenhouse gases.
But this step points toward a sensible and substantial refashioning of the principle, one
that ensures that low-probability catastrophes are given careful attention, and that the
various risks at issue will be weighed and balanced in accordance with the facts.
2.. Biases. In addition, advocates of the precautionary principle might urge that
environmental values are systematically disregarded in the regulatory process, or not
given their due, and hence that the principle helps counteract systematic biases.106 A
particular problem here is myopia107: Perhaps government officials, uninformed by the
precautionary principle, would fail to attend to risks that will not occur, or be seen to
occur, in the short-run. Another problem is that people tend to be unrealistically
optimistic.108 As a result, many low-level risks do not register at all. A related problem is
that people tend to reduce cognitive dissonance, sometimes by treating risks as if they are
tiny, even worth ignoring.109 When people think that they are “safe,” even though they
face a statistical risk, they might well be responding to emotions, seeking to avoid the
anxiety that comes from an understanding of the inevitability of risk.
On this view, the principle can be defended pragmatically, if not theoretically, as
a way of emphasizing the importance of attending to issues, especially environmental
issues, that might otherwise be neglected. In some settings, the pragmatic defense is
undoubtedly plausible, and the precautionary principle, applied with a narrow
106
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viewscreen, undoubtedly leads to some good results. But two problems remain. The first
is that environmental values are sometimes on both sides of the controversy; consider the
nuclear power controversy. The same is certainly true of health and safety, as shown by
the case of premarket testing of pharmaceuticals. The second is that even when
environmental values are on only one side, the interests and values on the other side
might well be at a comparative disadvantage too; consider the potential beneficiaries of
genetic modification of food. In short, a more modest and revised precautionary principle
might well make sense, but the less modest, and more distinctive, principle is hard to
defend.
3. Distribution. It is also possible to defend the precautionary principle on
distributional grounds. The Clean Air Act takes a precautionary approach, requiring an
“adequate margin of safety” and hence regulation in the fact of scientific uncertainty.110
At the same time, the Clean Air Act appears to be giving disproportionate benefits to
poor people and members of minority groups.111 Aggressive action to combat climate
change would be more beneficial to poor countries than to wealthy ones.112 This is partly
because wealthy countries are better able to adapt; it is partly because agriculture,
potentially vulnerable to climate change, is responsible for only 2% of the economy of
wealthy nations, but 50% of the economy of poor nations113; it is partly because one of
the most serious health risks posed by climate change consists of an increased incidence
of malaria, a nonproblem for wealthy countries.114 In the context of global warming, at
least, the precautionary principle might be invoked to prevent especially severe burdens
on those in the worst position to bear them.
Of course it makes sense to be concerned with the distribution of domestic or
international risks. The problem of global warming owes its origin to the actions of
wealthy nations, and hence it makes special sense to ask those nations to bear a
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disproportionate cost of correction if poor nations are likely to be hit hardest. The
distributional effects of global warming are among the strongest points in favor
aggressive regulation of greenhouse gases.115 But in many cases, the precautionary
principle, as applied, would threaten to have unfortunate distributional effects. The case
of genetic modification of food is an example; here the benefits are likely to be enjoyed
by poor people, not the wealthy.116 The case of DDT is similar. While a ban on DDT,
supported by reference to the precautionary principle, is eminently justified in wealthy
nations, such a ban is likely to have bad effects in at least some poor countries, where
DDT is the cheapest and most effective way of combating serious diseases, most notably
malaria.117 Distributional issues should indeed be a part of a system of risk regulation, but
the precautionary principle is a crude, indirect, and sometimes perverse way of
incorporating distributional concerns.
4. Risk vs. uncertainty. A more subtle point is possible. Often regulators, and
ordinary people, are acting in a situation of risk (where probabilities can be assigned to
various outcomes) rather than uncertainty (where no such probabilities can be
assigned).118 Thus far I have been speaking as if environmental and other risk-related
problems involved a risks of ascertainable probability—so that analysts are able to say
that the risk of X number of deaths in Y percent, whereas the risk of 2X number of deaths
is Y/n, and so forth. But we can imagine instances in which analysts cannot specify even
a range of probability, and in which the extent of the harm is also not susceptible to even
vague probabilistic prediction.119
In a situation of uncertainty, when existing knowledge does not permit regulators
to assign probabilities to outcomes, it is standard to follow the maximin principle: Choose
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the policy with the best worst-case outcome.120 Perhaps the precautionary principle, as
applied, is a form of the maximin principle, asking officials to identify the worst case
among the various options, and to select that option whose worst-case is least bad.
Perhaps the maximin principle would support many proposed applications of the
precautionary principle, by, for example, urging aggressive steps to combat global
warming.
This is not an implausible suggestion; sometimes it is best to respond to the
worst-case scenario, as some governments do in the face of risks to national security (not
excluding those risks posed by terrorism). But the response faces three problems. The
first is that the precautionary principle is not the maximin principle, and if the latter
principle is what is meant, then we should be discussing that principle directly, and
evaluating it against the alternatives. The precautionary principle obscures those issues.
The second problem is that so defended, the principle might well prevent rational
priority-setting, simply because it “leads to a disproportionate allocation of limited
regulatory priorities to those activities posing relatively more uncertainty, because the
worst case assumption inflates their harm value relative to risks that are better
characterized.”121 The third problem is that risks that are now in the realm of uncertainty
will often move, over time, into the realm of risk. Indeed, one of the principal goals of a
well-functioning system of environmental protection is to acquire more information about
potential hazards, information that includes an understanding of the probability of harm.
In some circumstances, acquiring information is far better than responding to the worstcase scenario, at least when that response itself creates dangers in the realm of both
uncertainty and risk.122
5. Salutary goals. We are now in a position to appreciate some of the goals of
those who invoke the precautionary principle. Serious environmental problems might be
addressed too late, or not at all, simply because causal connections cannot be described
with certainty. In the context of tobacco, for example, a serious public health movement
120
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was muted simply by virtue of scientific doubt123—even though reasonable people take
steps to reduce likelihoods, not only certainties, of adverse effects. The precautionary
principle can be taken as a reminder not to require proof. To the extent that the
precautionary principle is a reminder of obligations to the future, it is entirely salutary.
Those who invoke the principle undoubtedly are motivated, much of the time, by the goal
of protecting the most vulnerable people against risks to their safety and health.124 On this
view, the precautionary principle has strong moral goals, and they are distributive in
character.
Nothing I have said is meant to draw these goals into doubt. My claim is that the
precautionary principle is a crude and sometimes perverse way of promoting the relevant
goals—and that if it is taken seriously, it is paralyzing, and therefore not helpful at all.
IV. The Operation of the Precautionary Principle: A Behavioral Account
In practice, the precautionary principle is widely thought to provide concrete
guidance.125 How can this be? I suggest that the principle becomes operational if and only
if those who apply it wear blinders—only, that is, if they focus on some aspects of the
regulatory situation but downplay or disregard others. Consider, for example, those who
think that the precautionary principle requires restrictions on genetic engineering of food;
to have this belief, it is necessary to ignore the potential health benefits of the practice. Or
consider those who think that the precautionary principle calls for stringent regulation of
greenhouse gases; such people neglect the need to adopt precautions against the very
risks introduced by stringent regulation. In the same vein, those who invoke the
precautionary principle to seek regulation of human cloning neglect the possibility that
without therapeutic cloning, many people will die.126
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But these points simply raise an additional question: Why is the precautionary
principle so influential? Why does it speak to so many people? I believe that much of the
answer lies in an understanding of behavioral economics and cognitive psychology. Five
points are especially pertinent. Taken together, they help explain the kinds of blinders
that people wear when they use the precautionary principle to support concrete outcomes.
The points help show the sense in which the relevant blinders are not arbitrary or
coincidental. They have some unmistakable structure.
A. Loss Aversion and Familiarity
1. In general. People tend to be loss averse, which means that a loss from the
status quo is seen as more undesirable than a gain is seen as desirable.127 To see how loss
aversion works, consider some of the classic experiments, which involve the endowment
effect.128 People who were initially endowed with certain goods—such as coffee mugs,
chocolate bars, and binoculars—valued those goods far more than those who were not
initially endowed with them. The reason for the endowment effect is loss aversion129:
People are much more distressed by the prospect of loss than they are pleased by the
prospect of equivalent gain. Another way to put the point is to say that contrary to
economic theory, people do not value out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs the same.
Opportunity costs, as foregone gains, seem to be far less bad, on a per-dollar basis, than
out-of-pocket costs.
In the context of risk regulation, there is a clear implication: People will be
closely attuned to the losses produced by any newly introduced risk, or any aggravation
of existing risks, but far less concerned with the benefits that are foregone as a result of
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regulation. I believe that loss aversion helps to explain what makes the precautionary
principle operational: The opportunity costs of regulation often register little or not at all,
whereas the out-of-pocket costs of the activity or substance in question are entirely
visible. In fact this is a form of status quo bias.130 The status quo marks the baseline
against which gains and losses are measured, and a loss from the status quo seems much
more bad than a gain from the status quo seems good.
If loss aversion is at work, we would predict that the precautionary principle
would place a spotlight on the losses introduced by some risk, and downplay the benefits
foregone as a result of controls. In fact this is what we have observed in several
contexts.131 Whenever the “opportunity benefits” are off-screen, this will be the reason
that the precautionary principle appears to give guidance notwithstanding the objections I
have made. At the same time, the neglected opportunity benefits present a devastating
problem with the use of the precautionary principle. In the context of genetic engineering
of food, this is very much the situation.132 We can find the same problem when the
precautionary principle is invoked to support bans on nonreproductive cloning.133 For
many people, the possible harms of cloning register more strongly than the potential
therapeutic benefits that would eliminated by a ban on the practice.
Loss aversion is closely associated with another cognitive finding: People are far
more willing to tolerate familiar risks than unfamiliar ones, even if they are statistically
equivalent.134 The risks associated with driving do not occasion a great deal of concern,
even though tens of thousands of people die from motor vehicle accidents each year. The
relevant risks are simply seen as part of life. By contrast, many people are quite
concerned about risks that appear newer, such as the risks associated with genetically
modified foods, newly introduced chemicals, nuclear power plants, and terrorism. Part of
the reason for the asymmetry may be a belief that with new risks, we are in the domain of
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uncertainty rather than risk, and hence it makes sense to be cautious when probabilities
cannot be assigned. But the individual and social propensity to focus on new risks
outruns that sensible propensity; it makes the precautionary principle operational by
emphasizing a subset of the hazards actually involved.
B. The Mythical Benevolence of Nature
Sometimes the precautionary principle operates by incorporating the belief that
nature is essentially benign and that human intervention is likely to carry risks—as in the
suggestion that the precautionary principle calls for stringent regulation of pesticides.
This is a distinctive form of loss aversion. The idea is that any human intervention will
create loss from the status quo, and that this loss should carry great weight, whereas the
gains should be regarded with some suspicion or at least be taken as less weighty. Often
lose aversion and a belief in nature’s benevolence march hand-in-hand: The status quo
forms the baseline or reference state against which to assess deviations. Processes that
interfere with nature seem, on the part of many, to be taken as troubling “degradation”—
whereas gains or improvements seem, other things being equal, far less significant.
A belief in the benevolence of nature does seem to play a role in the operation of
the precautionary principle, especially among those who see nature as harmonious or in
balance. In fact many of those who endorse the principle seem to be especially concerned
about new technologies. Certainly most people believe that natural chemicals are more
safe than man-made chemicals.135 (Most toxicologists disagree.136) On this view, the
principle calls for caution when people are intervening into the natural world. Here of
course we can find considerable sense: Nature often consists of systems, and
interventions into systems can cause a number of problems. New technologies can
produce unintended bad effects, if only because they interfere with systems. But there is a
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large problem with this understanding of the precautionary principle. What is natural may
not be safe at all.137
Consider, for example, the idea that there is a “balance of nature.” According to a
recent account, this idea is “not true.”138 A scientific “revolution has shown that nature
“is characterized by change, not constancy,”139 and that “natural ecological systems are
dynamic,” with desirable changes being “those induced through human action.”140 In any
case nature is often a realm of destruction, illness, killing, and death.141 Hence the claim
cannot be that human activity is necessarily or systematically more destructive than what
nature does. Nor is it clear that natural products are comparatively safe.142 Organic foods,
favored by many people on grounds of safety and health and creating annual revenues of
$4.5 billion in the United States alone, are “actually riskier to consume than food grown
with synthetic chemicals.”143 If the precautionary principle is seen to raise doubts about
pesticides, but not about organic foods, it is probably because the health risks that come
with departures from “nature” register as especially troublesome. Of course some of the
most serious risks are a product of nature. Tobacco smoking kills 400,000 Americans
each year; the precautionary principle might be (but has not been) directed against it.
Nothing is more natural than exposure to sunlight, but such exposure is associated with
skin cancer and other harms,144 producing serious health problems that have not been the
occasion for invoking the precautionary principle.
To say this is not to resolve specific issues, which depend on complex questions
of value and fact.145 My only suggestion is that the false belief in a benevolence of nature

137

See James P. Collman, Naturally Dangerous (2001).
See Botkin, Adjusting Law to Nature’s Discordant Harmonies, 7 Duke Env’l Law and Policy Forum 25,
27 (1996).
139
Id.
140
Id. at 33.
141
As elaborated in detail in John Stuart Mill, Nature, in Three Essays on Religion 3, 28-31 (1996).
142
See Collman, supra note.
143
Id. at 31.
144
Id. at 199-201.
145
For a helpful discussion of genetic modification of food and related issues, see McHughen, Pandora’s
Picket Basket, supra note.
138

30

help to explain why the precautionary principle is thought, quite incorrectly, to provide a
great deal of analytical help.
C. The Availability Heuristic
It is well-established that in thinking about risks, people rely on certain heuristics,
or rules of thumb, which serve to simply their inquiry.146 Of these rules of thumb, the
availability heuristic is most important for purposes of understanding the law relating to
risks.147 The availability heuristic also helps illuminate the operation of the precautionary
principle, by showing why some hazards will be on-screen and why others will be
neglected. For example, “a class whose instances are easily retrieved will appear more
numerous than a class of equal frequency whose instances are less retrievable.”148
Tversky and Kahneman demonstrate the point with a simple study showing people a list
of well-known people of both sexes, and asking them whether the list contains more
names of women or more names of men. In lists in which the men were especially
famous, people thought that the list had more names of men, whereas in lists in which the
women were the more famous, people thought that the list had more names of women.149
This is a point about how familiarity can affect the availability of instances. A risk
that is familiar, like the risk associated with nuclear power, will be seen as more serious
than a risk that is less familiar, like the risk associated with heat during the summer.150
But salience is important as well. “For example, the impact of seeing a house burning on
the subjective probability of such accidents is probably greater than the impact of reading
about a fire in the local paper.”151 So too, recent events will have a greater impact than
earlier ones. The point helps explain much risk-related behavior, including decisions to
take precautions. For example, whether people will buy insurance for natural disasters is
146
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greatly affected by recent experiences.152 If floods have not occurred in the immediate
past, people who live on flood plains are far less likely to purchase insurance.153 In the
aftermath of an earthquake, insurance for earthquakes rises sharply—but it declines
steadily from that point, as vivid memories recede.154 Note that the use of the availability
heuristic, in these contexts, is hardly irrational.155 Both insurance and precautionary
measures can be expensive, and what has happened before seems, much of the time, to be
the best available guide to what will happen again. The problem is that the availability
heuristic can lead to serious errors, in terms of both excessive fear and neglect.
The availability heuristic helps to explains the operation of the precautionary
principle for a simple reason: Sometimes a certain risk, said to call for precautions, is
cognitively available, whereas other risks, including the risks associated with regulation
itself, are not. For example, it is easy to see that arsenic is potentially dangerous; arsenic
is well-known as a poison, forming the first word of a well-known movie about
poisoning.156 By contrast, there is a relatively complex mental operation in the judgment
that arsenic regulation might lead people to use less safe alternatives. In many cases
where the precautionary principle seems to offer guidance, the reason is that some of the
relevant risks are available while others are barely visible.
It is well-known that the availability heuristic affects risk judgments, and we can
now appreciate the relationship between that heuristic and the operation of the
precautionary principle. But to say the least, the availability heuristic does not operate in
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a social vacuum.157 What is readily “available” to some individuals, groups, cultures, and
even nations will not be available to all. In part because of the use of the availability
heuristic, the precautionary principle does not call for bans on nuclear power plants in
France, which has not caused serious health risks in that nation despite its heavy reliance
on nuclear energy.158 By contrast, the Three Mile Island incident provoked intense
concerns about nuclear power plants in the United States159 and helped promote the
widespread idea that a precautionary approach would discourage reliance on nuclear
power. Many of those who favor gun control legislation have “available” a set of
incidents in which such legislation would have avoided unnecessary deaths; many of
those who reject such legislation are alert to incidents in which private gun ownership
allowed people to fend off criminal violence.160 Much remains to be done to clarify the
relationship between the availability heuristic and social interactions, including the
operations of the media and political officials. For present purposes, the key point is that
the availability heuristic often underwrites the use of the precautionary principle, by
suggesting the importance of taking precautions against some, but hardly all, of the risks
involved.
D. Probability Neglect
The availability heuristic can produce an inaccurate assessment of probability.
But sometimes people will attempt little assessment of probability at all, especially when
strong emotions are involved. 161 In such cases, large-scale variations in probabilities will
matter little—even when those variations unquestionably should matter. The point
applies to hope as well as fear; vivid images of good outcomes will crowd out
consideration of probability too.162 Lotteries are successful partly for this reason.163 But
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for purposes of applying the precautionary principle, the topic is fear rather than hope. I
suggest that sometimes the precautionary principle becomes workable because the issue
of probability is neglected, and people focus on one emotionally gripping outcome
among a large set of possibilities.
Probability neglect has received its clearest empirical confirmation in a striking
study of people’s willingness to pay to avoid electric shocks.164 The central purpose of
the study was to test the relevance of probability in “affect rich” decisions. One
experiment investigated whether varying the probability of harm would matter more, or
less, in settings that trigger strong emotions than in settings that seem relatively emotionfree. In the “strong emotion” setting, participants were asked to imagine that they would
participate in an experiment involving some chance of a “short, painful, but not
dangerous electric shock.”165 In the relatively emotion-free setting, participants were told
that the experiment entailed some chance of a $20 penalty. Participants were asked to say
how much they would be willing to pay to avoid participating in the relevant experiment.
Some participants were told that there was a 1% chance of receiving the bad outcome
(either the $20 loss or the electric shock); others were told that the chance was 99%; and
still others were told that the chance was 100%.
The central result was that variations in probability affected those facing the
relatively emotion-free injury, the $20 penalty, far more than they affected people facing
the more emotionally evocative outcome of an electric shock.166 For the cash penalty, the
difference between the median payment for a 1% chance and the median payment for a
99% chance was predictably large and indeed consistent with the standard model: $1 to
avoid a 1% chance, and $18 to avoid a 99% chance.167 For the electric shock, by contrast,
the difference in probability made little difference to median willingness to pay: $7 to
avoid a 1% chance, and $10 to avoid a 99% chance!168 Apparently people will pay a
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significant amount to avoid a small probability of a hazard that is affectively-laden—and
the amount that they will pay will not vary greatly with changes in probability. The point
explains “why societal concerns about hazards such as nuclear power and exposure to
extremely small amounts of toxic chemicals fail to recede in response to information
about the very small probabilities of the feared consequences from such hazards.”169
It should be easy to the connection between probability neglect and the
precautionary principle. If probabilities are neglected, especially when emotions are
engaged, then the principle will operate through excessive public concern with certain
low-probability hazards. Return to the contrast between deaths from heat waves and
deaths from airplane crashes.170 The latter trigger far more intense public attention, in
part because of the availability heuristic, but in part because for some people, the
outcome itself has such salience, and the probability much less so. In the context of
genetic modification of food and global warming, the same phenomenon is at work,
leading people to think that the precautionary principle, simply applied, calls for
aggressive regulatory controls. Note that I am not urging that such controls are a mistake;
in the context of global warming, they seem to be warranted by the facts. My claim is
only that the precautionary principle appears to give guidance in part because the issue of
probability is neglected.
For purposes of understanding the operation of the precautionary principle, it is
important to see that visualization or imagery matters a great deal to people’s reactions to
risks.171 When an image of a bad outcome is easily accessible, people will become greatly
concerned about a risk, holding probability constant.172 Consider the fact that when
people are asked how much they will pay for flight insurance for losses resulting from
“terrorism,” they will pay more than if they are asked how much they will pay for flight
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insurance from all causes.173 The evident explanation for this peculiar result is that the
word “terrorism” evokes vivid images of disaster, thus crowding out probability
judgments. Note also that when people discuss a low-probability risk, their concern rises
even if the discussion consists mostly of apparently trustworthy assurances that the
likelihood of harm really is infinitesmal.174 The reason is that the discussion makes it
easier to visualize the risk and hence to fear it.
Note that probability neglect does not involve the availability heuristic. That
heuristic leads not to neglect probability, but to answer the question of probability by
substituting a hard question (what is the statistical risk?) with an easy question (do salient
examples readily come to mind?).175 My point here is not that visualization makes an
event seem more probable (though this is also often true), but that visualization makes the
issue of probability less relevant or even irrelevant. In theory, the distinction between use
of the availability heuristic and probability neglect should not be obscure. In practice, of
course, it will often be hard to know whether the availability heuristic or probability
neglect is driving behavior.
The most sensible conclusion is that with respect to risks of injury of harm, vivid
images and concrete pictures of disaster can “crowd out” other kinds of thoughts,
including the crucial thought that the probability of disaster is really small. “If someone is
predisposed to be worried, degrees of unlikeliness seem to provide no comfort, unless
one can prove that harm is absolutely impossible, which itself is not possible.”176
Probability neglect, I suggest, often makes the precautionary principle seem sensible and
workable. Indeed, the precautionary principle often embodies a form of probability
neglect. When people focus on highly speculative risks associated with certain risks, it is
often because of intense emotional reactions that make those risks, and not relevant
others, stand out from the background. In many cases, probability neglect and loss
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aversion march hand-in-hand. Potential losses, from the status quo, often trigger intense
emotions, as potential gains do not; and when the precautionary principle is operating, the
low-probability losses have far more salience than they deserve.177
Nor is the problem of probability neglect foreign to law. In many contexts, law
seems to be a response, in part, to fear of bad outcomes without close attention to the
question of probability—along one dimension, the precautionary principle in action.178
The European Community’s ban on meat products treated with hormones has raised
large-scale issues about the role of public fear in risk regulation.179 The Appellate Body
of the World Trade Organization ruled180 that the ban ran afoul of Article 5.1 of the
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement),181 which requires
members of the WTO to justify all health and safety regulations by reference to scientific
risk assessments.182 In this way, the Appellate Body rejected the EC’s effort to defend
itself in part by reference to consumer fears about the safety of beef treated with
hormones.183 In this context, such fears were apparently real, but they neglected the issue
of probability.184
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E. System Neglect
The fourth point is, in a way, the largest. My suggestion is that much of the time,
and with respect to risks, people neglect the systemic effect of one-shot interventions.
They tend to assume that a change in a social situation would alter the part at issue, but
without altering other parts. System neglect, thus understood, includes the general
phenomenon of tradeoff neglect, by which people fail to see the frequent need to way
competing variables against one another.185 But tradeoff neglect is only part of what is
involved here. When the precautionary principle gives guidance, and when it goes wrong,
it is often because those who use it are falling victim to system neglect.
The clearest evidence comes from the German psychologist Dietrich Dorner, who
has designed some fascinating experiments to see whether people can reduce social
risks.186 Dorner’s experiments are run via computer. Participants are asked to reduce risks
faced by the inhabitants of some region of the world. The risks may involve pollution,
poverty, poor medical care, inadequate fertilization of crops, sick cattle, insufficient
water, or excessive hunting and fishing. Through the magic of the computer, many policy
initiatives are available—improved care of cattle, childhood immunization, drilling more
wells). Participants are able to choose among them. Once particular initiatives are chosen,
the computer projects, over short periods and then over decades, what is likely to happen
in the region.
In these experiments, success is entirely possible. Some initiatives will actually
make for effective and enduring improvements. But many of the participants—even the
most educated and professional—produce calamities. They do so because they fixate on
isolated problems and do not see the complex, system-wide effects of particular
interventions. For example, they may appreciate the importance of increasing the number
of cattle, but once they do that, they create a serious risk of overgrazing, and they fail to
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anticipate that problem.187 They may understand full well the value of drilling more wells
to provide water, but they do not anticipate the energy and environmental effects of the
drilling, which then endangers the food supply. Only the rare participant is able to see a
number of steps down the road—to understand the multiple effects of one-shot
interventions into the system, and to assess a wide range of consequences from those
interventions. The successful participants seem to take small, reversible steps, or to see
the full set of effects at once, and thus to protect themselves against major blunders.
When people are not successful, it is because they fail to see that risks are parts of
systems.188
How would the precautionary principle operate if invoked in Dorner’s
experiments? It should be easy to see that while the weaker version might provide some
assistance, the stronger versions offer no help at all. There are simply too many risks
against which one might take precautions. Precautions cannot be taken against all risks,
not for the important but less interesting reason that resources are limited, but simply
because efforts to redress any set of risks might produce risks of their own. The real
world of risk regulation offers many analogues.189 To the extent that the precautionary
principle appears to offer guidance, it is often because adverse systemic effects, and the
need to take precautions against them, are simply being neglected.
Howard Margolis has used a related point to explain why experts have different
risk judgments from ordinary people, and he has done so in a particular effort to explain
why and when ordinary people will think, “Better safe than sorry.”190 Margolis thus
offers some cognitive foundations for the precautionary principle, without explicitly
discussing the idea. Margolis’ goal is to cast light on some apparent anomalies in
ordinary thinking about risks: Why do people believe that small risks from pesticides
should be regulated, if comparatively small risks from X-rays are quite tolerable? Why
are people so concerned about the risks of nuclear power, when experts tend to believe
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that the risks are quite low—lower, in fact, than the risks from competing energy sources,
such as coal-fired power plants, which produce relatively little public objection?
Margolis suggests that people are sometimes subject to a kind of optical illusion,
in which they see the harms associated with some activity or process, but fail to see the
benefits. If so, they will tend to think, “better safe they sorry.”191 If not, they will see
some “fungibility” between both harms and benefits, and engage in the kind of tradeoff
analysis that is more typical for experts.192 Margolis offers a nice example to support this
suggestion.193 The removal of asbestos from schools in New York City was initially quite
popular, indeed demanded by parents, even though experts believed that the risks were
statistically small. (As it happens, the risk of a child getting cancer from asbestos
insulation was about 1/3 the risk of being struck by lightning.) But when it emerged that
the removal would cause schools to be closed for a period of weeks, and when the closing
caused parents to become greatly inconvenienced, parental attitudes turned right around,
and asbestos removal seemed like a really bad idea. When the costs of the removal came
on-screen, parents thought much more like experts, and the risks of asbestos seemed well
worth tolerating: Statistically small, and on balance worth incurring. The precautionary
principle often operates because of the visibility of only one side of the ledger, so that
people think that parents in advance of asbestos removal, seeing the possibility of hazard
without confronting the problems introducing by reducing it.
For an especially vivid example, consider the apparent views of Americans in the
late 1990s. About 63 percent of Americans agreed with the statement: “Protecting the
environment is so important that requirements and standards cannot be too high and
continuing environmental improvements must be made regardless of cost.”194 In the same
general vein, 59 percent supported the Kyoto Treaty on global warming, with only 21
percent opposed.195 But in the same period, 52 percent of Americans said that they would
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refuse to support the Kyoto Treaty on global warming if “it would cost an extra $50 per
month for an average American household.”196 In fact only 11 percent of Americans
would support the Kyoto Treaty if the monthly expense were $100 or more.197 How can
we explain strong majority support for “environmental improvements . . . regardless of
cost” and strong majority rejection of environmental improvements when the cost if
high? The answer lies in the fact that people are not, in fact, willing to spend an infinite
amount for environmental improvements, and that when the costs are squarely placed “on
screen,” people begin to weigh both costs and benefits.
There are many other examples. People seem quite concerned about the risks
associated with dioxin, a real candidate for use of the precautionary principle, but far less
concerned about the statistically equivalent risks associated with aflatoxin, a carcinogen
found in peanut butter.198 When aflatoxin does not trigger public concern, a large part of
the reason is that the burdens of banning aflatoxin seem high and indeed intolerable; too
many people would object to heavy regulation of peanut butter, a staple of school lunches
and many diets for generations. In this light it is both mildly counterintuitive and
reasonable, for example, to predict that people would be willing to pay less, in terms of
dollars and waiting time, to reduce low-probability risks of an airplane disaster if they are
frequent travellers. An intriguing study finds exactly that effect.199 It is also safe to
predict that if people were told, by a reliable source, that eliminating pesticides would
lead to serious health problems—for example, because pesticide-free fruits and
vegetables carried special dangers200—the perceived risk of pesticides would decline
dramatically, and it would be difficult to invoke the precautionary principle as a basis for
stringent regulation of pesticides.201 Indeed I predict that if people were informed that
eliminating pesticides would lead to a significant cost in the price of applies and oranges,
the perceived risk would go down as well.202
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The conclusion is that the precautionary principle often seems helpful because
analysts are focussing on the “target” risk, and not on the systemic, risk-related effects of
being precautionary, or even on the risk-related consequences of risk reduction. Rational
regulators, of course, think about systems, not snapshots.203 And once we see that risks
are inevitably parts of systems, the precautionary principle will become far less helpful.
V. Toward Wider Viewscreens
In this Article I have argued not that the precautionary principle leads in the
wrong directions, but that if it is taken for all that it is worth, it leads in no direction at all.
The reason is that risks of one kind or another are on all sides of regulatory choices, and
it is therefore impossible, in most real-world cases, to avoid running afoul of the
principle. Frequently risk regulation creates a (speculative) risk from substitute risks or
from foregone risk-reduction opportunities. And because of the (speculative) mortality
and morbidity effects of costly regulation, any regulation, if it is costly, threatens to run
afoul of the precautionary principle. We have seen that both regulation and nonregulation
seem to be forbidden in cases involving nuclear power, arsenic, global warming, and
genetic modification of food. The precautionary principle seems to offer guidance only
because people blind themselves to certain aspects of the risk situation, focusing on a
mere subset of the hazards that are at stake.
To some extent, those who endorse the precautionary principle seem to be
responding to salutary political or moral motivations that the principle might be thought
to embody. Well-organized private groups sometimes demand conclusive proof of harm
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as a precondition for regulation; the demand should be firmly resisted, because a
probability of harm is, under many circumstances, a sufficient reason to act. Both
individuals and societies have a tendency to neglect the future; the precautionary
principle might be understood as a warning against that form of neglect. There are
extremely good reasons to incorporate distributional considerations into risk regulation,
and the precautionary principle seems, some of the time, to be a way to protect the most
disadvantaged against risks of illness, accident, and death. Sometimes people try to
reduce dissonance by thinking that actual risks are trivial; the precautionary principle
might work as a helpful counterweight to this mechanism. The problem is that the
precautionary principle, as applied, is a crude and sometimes perverse way to promote
these various goals, not least because it might be, and has been, urged in situations in
which the principle threatens to injure future generations and to harm rather than to help
those who are most disadvantaged.
I have also urged that the precautionary principle can be made operational only
because of identifiable cognitive mechanisms. Often loss aversion is at work. The
benefits of certain practices are less salient than the costs, simply because the costs
would, along an important dimension, represent a deterioration from the status quo.
When loss aversion is involved, it might be thought, wrongly, that natural processes are
always safer, and better for the environment, than processes that involve human
intervention. Sometimes the precautionary principle works by exploiting the availability
heuristic, because the risks that matter are cognitively accessible, whereas the risks that
are ignored are far less so. Frequently the precautionary principle is underwritten by
probability neglect. Highly speculative harms are emphasized by those who focus on the
badness of the relevant outcomes, rather than the likelihood that they will occur. Most
generally, the precautionary principle sometimes gives an illusion of guidance because
people focus on the immediate risk while disregarding the systemic effects of one-shot
interventions, even though those interventions can give rise to risks of their own.
I have not suggested any particular substitute for the precautionary principle.
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But I do not endorse the suggestion of Aaron Wildavsky, a political scientist with a
special interest in risk regulation, who also rejects the precautionary principle.204 In
Wildavsky’s view, the notion of “precaution” should be abandoned and replaced with a
principle of “resilience,” based on an understanding that nature, and society, are quite
able to incorporate even strong shocks, and that the ultimate dangers are therefore smaller
than we are likely to fear. It would follow from the “resilience” principle that a nation
should be less concerned than it now is with the risks associated with (for example)
arsenic, global warming, and destruction of the ozone layer. Unfortunately, the principle
of “resilience” is no better than that of “precaution.” Some systems are resilient, but
many are not. Whether an ecosystem, or a society, is “resilent” cannot be decided in the
abstract. In any case resilience is a matter of degree. Everything depends on the facts. The
“resilience principle” should be understood as a heuristic, one that favors inaction in the
face of possibly damaging technological change. Like most heuristics, the resilience
principle will work well in many circumstances, but it can also lead to systematic and
even deadly errors.205
A better approach would acknowledge that a wide variety of adverse effects may
come from inaction, regulation, and everything between. Such an approach would
attempt to consider all of those adverse effects, not simply a subset.206 When existing
knowledge does not allow clear assessments of the full range of adverse effects, such an
approach would develop simplifying devices, helping to show the appropriate course of
action in the face of uncertainty.207 Such an approach would pursue distributional goals
204

See Aaron Wildavsky, But Is It True? A Citizen’s Guide to Environmental Health and Safety Issues 433
(1995).
205
Cf. See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in
Judgment and Decision Making: A Interdisciplinary Reader 38, 55 (Hal Arkes and Kenneth Hammond).
(emphasizing that heuristic can lead to systematic mistakes). The resilience principle might well be taken as
a reflection of optimistic bias. See Neil Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
Personality and Soc Psych. 806 (1980); Shelly Taylor, Positive Illusions (1991).
206
See Wiener, supra note; Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason (forthcoming 2002).
207
See Goklany, supra note, at 9-10. Instead of advocating full-fledged balancing of relevant variables,
Goklany proposes that regulators look at a list of criteria, including “the human mortality criterion”
(valuing human life over that of members of other species), “the immediacy criterion” (giving priority to
immediate threats), “the uncertainty criterion” (giving priority to risks with a higher probability of
occurring), and “the irreversibility criterion” (giving priority to risks that are likely to be permanent or
persistent). Some of these criteria seem to me doubtful; a less immediate threat might, for example, deserve
priority if its magnitude so suggests, and it is unclear that a small number of human lives deserve priority
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directly by, for example, requiring wealthy countries, major contributors to the problem
of global warming, to pay poor countries to reduce greenhouse gases or to prepare
themselves for the relevant risks. And such an approach would attempt to counteract,
rather than to embody, the various cognitive limitations that people face in thinking about
risks. An appreciation of the difficulties with the precautionary principle suggests the
importance of overcoming cognitive limitations by ensuring that people have a full,
rather than limited, sense of what is at stake. The result should be to help with cognitive
distortions and to produce sensible priority-setting. An effort to produce a fair accounting
of the universe of dangers should also help to diminish the danger of interest-group
manipulation.
To be sure, public alarm, even if ill-informed, is itself a harm, and it is likely to
lead to additional harms, perhaps in the form of large-scale “ripple effects.”208 A sensible
approach to risk will attempt to reduce public fear even if it is baseless. My goal here has
been not to deny that point, but to explain the otherwise puzzling appeal of the
precautionary principle and to isolate the strategies that help make it operational. At the
individual level, these strategies are hardly senseless, especially for people who lack
much information or who do the best they can by focussing on only one aspect of the
situation at hand.209 But for governments, the precautionary principle is not sensible, for
the simple reason that once the viewscreen is widened, it become clear that the principle
provides no guidance at all. A rational system of risk regulation certainly takes
precautions. But it does not adopt the precautionary principle.

over a large number of lives of members of other species. But Goklany is correct to seek an approach that
helps in making decisions under uncertainty. Wiener, supra note, offers some valuable suggestions,
involving in partcular the need to ensure “risk-superior moves,” meaning approaches that reduce overall
risks. (Unpublished manuscript at 16.) The problem with this approach is that sometimes we will lack
sufficient information to identify such moves, because regulation must proceed in the face of uncertainty
rather than risk. See above.
208
See the discussion of the social amplification of risk in Slovic, supra note.
209
See Gerd Gigerenzer et al., Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart (1999).
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Readers with comments may address them to:
Cass R. Sunstein
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
csunstei@midway.uchicago.edu
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